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Abstract 
We study the short- and medium-term impacts of the recent recession on the 
distribution of net household income in the UK. We document trends in  
the distribution of income during and immediately after the economy’s 6.3 
per cent contraction between 2008Q1 and 2009Q2. We then use a tax  
and benefit microsimulation model combined with macroeconomic and 
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demographic forecasts to project the distribution of income up to 2015–16. 
As in other countries, immediate impacts of the recession on net household 
incomes are remarkably hard to detect, but the pain was merely delayed until 
2010–11 and beyond. We find that the major difference between income 
groups is in the timing of the reductions in income, rather than in their 
magnitude. For those in the middle and upper parts of the distribution, 
dependent mainly on labour market income, falls in real income happened 
largely between 2009–10 and 2011–12. For those towards the bottom, 
dependent more on benefit incomes, falls in real income will happen largely 
as a result of the post-recession fiscal tightening between 2010–11 and 
2015–16. We explore the sensitivity of the results to different scenarios for 
employment and earnings: the central and qualitative conclusions prove 
robust. 
Policy points 
• We project that the reductions in household income between 2007–08 
and 2015–16 will be spread quite evenly across the income distribution. 
• The timing of the recession’s impact is very different across income 
groups. Those on middle and higher incomes, largely dependent on 
labour market incomes, were hit immediately after the recession as real 
earnings fell sharply. Lower-income families, and in particular those 
with children, tended to fare less badly than others over that period, but 
are being hit relatively hard by the tax and benefit measures during the 
post-recession fiscal consolidation. 
• The large planned net ‘takeaway’ from households during the fiscal 
consolidation is a major driver of the pattern of income changes that we 
expect to see up to 2015–16. Qualitatively, our conclusions are therefore 
robust to the direct impacts of quite large deviations in employment and 
earnings from their forecast levels in the medium term. 
I. Introduction 
The UK recently experienced its deepest recession since the Second World 
War, during which GDP fell by over 6 per cent between the first quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2009. We would naturally expect this fall in 
national income to have consequences for households’ living standards; but 
when, how and for whom? This paper examines the immediate consequences 
of the recession for the distribution of net household income in the UK, 
and uses microsimulation methods to predict the likely longer-term 
consequences (up to 2015–16), given current government policies and the 
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latest available economic forecasts.1 We separately identify the likely impact 
on the distribution of income of the welfare cuts and changes to personal 
taxes that have been implemented from April 2011 (in other words, since the 
last change of government in the UK) or are planned for implementation 
between now and March 2016.  
As we shall show, the most obvious effects of the recession on the 
income distribution, via labour market trends and fiscal responses, were by 
no means immediate, and indeed are expected to continue for some time. In 
addition, official data on household incomes in the UK are invariably out of 
date. For these reasons, relatively little analysis of the relationship between 
the recent recession and the distribution of income in the UK exists.  
Of course, we are not the first to consider this important issue. Ozdemir, 
Sanoussi and Ward (2010) combine observed changes in the labour market 
from the start of the crisis with simple statistics relating labour market  
status to the risk of poverty to assess how the recession might have affected 
poverty across the European Union. Jenkins et al. (2012) provide a 
comprehensive survey of changes in the labour market and the income 
distribution for six countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the UK and 
the US) during and immediately after the recession, from 2007–08 to 2010–
11.2 They include an analysis of actual household income data, but also the 
use of microsimulation techniques to ‘nowcast’ the present income 
distribution.3 Their work highlights that average incomes tended to hold up 
surprisingly well during the recession itself, and that inequality measures 
tended to remain quite stable or to fall slightly. As we describe below, this 
paper extends the work for the UK in Jenkins et al. (2012). Muriel and 
Sibieta (2009) use household income data to study the actual evolution of 
living standards, inequality and poverty during previous UK recessions. 
Avram et al. (2013) simulate the distributional impacts of fiscal 
consolidation measures that had been implemented by 2012 in Estonia, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the UK. They 
suggest that these early elements of fiscal consolidation packages reduced 
incomes on average, but by widely varying amounts across countries; and 
they hit higher-income groups hardest for six out of the nine countries 
studied. Matsaganis and Leventi (2013) study the effects of the Greek 
recession and associated austerity package between 2009 and 2010. They 
find that these immediate effects, comprising a combination of falls in labour 
market incomes and austerity measures, were spread widely across income 
groups – overall income inequality was quite stable, and relative income 
 
1The December 2012 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2012). 
2The UK contribution to Jenkins et al. (2012) was produced by some of the current authors, and we 
draw on it in the analysis in this paper.  
3In this paper, we use the word ‘nowcasting’ to describe a situation in which an estimate of the current 
income distribution is produced given information on the past income distribution and information on 
some current demographic and economic aggregate statistics.  
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poverty rose slightly but by far less than absolute income poverty. Browne, 
Hood and Joyce (2013) project median income and poverty rates in the UK 
(against a moving and fixed poverty line) in the post-recession period from 
2010–11 to 2016–17, and in 2020–21. 
This paper studies the UK case in detail. It updates work in Jenkins et al. 
(2012) and combines this with the simulations underlying Browne, Hood and 
Joyce (2013), in order to study the short-term and likely medium-term 
implications of the recession for the income distribution as a whole. Section 
II describes our methods. Section III analyses trends across the income 
distribution between 2007–08 and 2011–12. This includes a ‘nowcast’ for 
2011–12. Section IV presents our central estimates of how the income 
distribution will evolve up to 2015–16. Section V presents counterfactuals 
and sensitivity tests. We conclude in Section VI. 
II. Data and methodology 
The UK’s primary source of information about the household income 
distribution is the official Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 
series. This series is currently based on data from the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS), an annual repeated cross-section of about 25,000 UK 
households administered by the Department for Work and Pensions. The 
most recent data available at the time of writing (February 2013) are for 
2010–11.4 The micro-data include a set of weights, which are intended to 
correct for non-random non-response and to gross up to known population 
aggregates.5 
The UK economy began to contract in the second quarter of 2008. In 
order to assess the impact of the recession on the distribution of household 
incomes, we perform three pieces of analysis: 
• we analyse actual micro-data on the household income distribution 
between 2007–08 and 2010–11 (inclusive); 
• we nowcast the household income distribution in 2011–12; 
• we project the household income distribution in 2012–13 to 2015–16, 
given stated plans for personal taxes and benefits and external 
macroeconomic forecasts. 
To implement the nowcasting and forecasting, we use microsimulation 
techniques. This allows us to simulate the entire distribution of income 
(rather than just average incomes or some other statistics) and to incorporate 
precisely the impact of tax and benefit changes (including often complicated 
interactions between them) on that distribution. Our method is as follows: 
 
4See Department for Work and Pensions (2012). 
5See Department for Work and Pensions (2005). 
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1. Begin with base micro-data (the 2010–11 FRS) on the distribution of 
private incomes and household characteristics. 
2. Uprate financial variables in the data (for example, earnings) in line with 
observed or forecast changes. 
3. Adjust certain characteristics of households to reflect major policy 
changes due between 2010–11 and 2015–16.6 
4. Reweight the data (using the algorithm set out in Gomulka (1992)) to 
account for forecast changes to employment and other socio-demographic 
variables; loosely speaking, this increases the relative weights given to 
types of people and households forecast to become relatively more 
common. 
5. Simulate the personal direct tax liabilities, and benefit and tax credit 
entitlements, of each household, given actual and expected future tax and 
benefit systems, taking into account pre-announced changes for future 
years. This is done using the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) static tax 
and benefit microsimulation model, TAXBEN.7 This does not allow for 
behavioural responses to tax and benefit changes at the micro level, 
although we account for them at the aggregate level to the extent that they 
are incorporated in the employment and average earnings forecasts of the 
Office for Budget Responsibility that we use (see footnote 6).  
6. Adjust simulated benefit and tax credit entitlements to account for the 
facts that not everyone who is entitled to such payments actually claims 
them and that not everyone who claims them correctly reports that they 
receive them to the household survey. 
7. Construct a measure of simulated net household income as close as 
possible to that used in the official HBAI series.  
This yields a simulated distribution of net household income in future 
years that is consistent with stated government policy on personal taxes and 
benefits and with the latest official economic and demographic forecasts. As 
in the HBAI series, the measure of income is net of taxes, inclusive of 
benefits and tax credits, and equivalised using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale; and the unit of analysis is the individual, although 
incomes are measured at the household level (in other words, we attribute to 
 
6We do this only for the state pension age for women, which will rise from 60 in April 2010 to 63 by 
April 2016. Our adjustment increases the labour supply (and thus earnings) of some women aged 60 to 
63, and gives other women of a similar age entitlement to employment and support allowance, a benefit 
for those of working age who cannot work through ill health or disability. No adjustment is made for 
women of any other age, nor for their partners. See appendix section D.3 of Browne, Hood and Joyce 
(2013) for a full description of the methods used. The fact that we do not make similar adjustments for 
other changes should be interpreted as our considering that the economic forecasts of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility fully reflect the likely behavioural response to important policy changes due over 
this period. 
7For a description, see Giles and McCrae (1995). The basic structure of the model has not changed 
since then. 
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each individual the total equivalised income of the household in which they 
live; this implicitly assumes full income sharing within households). We use 
a before-housing-costs measure of income.8  
We account for actual and pre-announced policy changes and 
macroeconomic forecasts up to and including the December 2012 Autumn 
Statement and Economic and Fiscal Outlook. The policy changes accounted 
for in step 5 above include numerous ‘takeaways’ from households in the 
form of tax rises and welfare cuts designed to reduce the structural budget 
deficit.9 They also include the phased introduction of universal credit – a 
major structural change to the welfare system, which will see six means-
tested benefits and tax credits replaced with a single integrated payment. The 
take-up assumption (step 6 above) underlying the modelling of universal 
credit is that, if a household reported receiving any of the six means-tested 
payments that universal credit will replace in the 2010–11 survey data, then 
it will take up universal credit if it is entitled to it (and will report such take-
up in future surveys). 
Below, we elaborate on the incorporation of macroeconomic forecasts 
into our microsimulation model (steps 2 and 4). Full details of the modelling 
approach are described in Browne, Hood and Joyce (2013). 
Up to 2011–12 (the last complete financial year at the time of writing), 
we account for changes in average pre-tax earnings (step 2 above) using the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) average weekly earnings index; but we 
incorporate heterogeneity, allowing for differential earnings growth by 
industry using figures from Oxford Economics. We account for the change 
in total employment using employment growth in 2011–12 as reported by 
the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), and again incorporate 
heterogeneity, allowing for differential employment changes by region and 
industry according to Oxford Economics figures.  
When looking beyond 2011–12, we use forecasts of employment and 
average earnings growth from the OBR, the government’s independent fiscal 
forecaster. The forecasts that we make use of were published on 5 December 
201210 and are reproduced in Table 1. Within the OBR forecasts for total 
employment and average earnings, we allow for heterogeneity in the same 
way as in 2011–12. Future earnings growth is allowed to vary by industry,  
 
 
8Further details on the measure of income used can be found in appendices 1 and 2 of Department for 
Work and Pensions (2012).  
9There are three welfare cuts that we do not model, because we do not have the data or modelling 
capacity necessary to do so. These are changes to the way that tax credit entitlements respond to within-
year income fluctuations; reductions in the age of youngest child at which a lone parent can claim income 
support rather than jobseeker’s allowance; and changes to council tax support from April 2013, which 
vary at the English local authority level. See appendix section D.2 of Browne, Hood and Joyce (2013) for 
further details and discussion. 
10Office for Budget Responsibility, 2012. 
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TABLE 1 
UK macroeconomic forecasts used in projections 
2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 
Annual CPI inflation 
to September 
3.1% 5.2% 2.2% 2.6% 2.2% 2.0% 
Annual RPI inflation 
to September 
4.6% 5.6% 2.6% 3.1% 2.7% 3.1% 
Annual RPI inflation, 
whole year 
5.0% 4.8% 3.1% 2.9% 2.8% 3.2% 
Annual Rossi inflation 
to Septembera 
4.8% 6.8% 2.8% 3.6% 3.1% 3.3% 
Employment 
(millions) 
29.1 29.2 29.6 29.6 29.8 30.0 
Average earnings 
growth 
0.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.2% 3.0% 3.9% 
Nominal GDP 
growth 
4.6% 3.3% 2.3% 3.6% 4.2% 4.4% 
aRossi inflation forecasts (see sources below) are available only quarterly. Rossi inflation figures in 
September from 2013 onwards are therefore assumed to equal the rate of inflation to quarter 3 of the 
relevant year. 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (2012) – table 2.1 from main document and economy 
supplementary tables 1.4 and 1.5.  
 
and changes in employment to vary by industry and region, all according to 
forecasts from Oxford Economics. In Section V, we examine the sensitivities 
of our results to variation in the OBR’s forecasts and under scenarios where 
the earnings distribution widens or narrows.  
All of our simulations also account for actual or forecast changes in 
demographic characteristics. As with expected employment changes, these 
are accounted for by reweighting the data (step 4 above; the full set of such  
 
TABLE 2 
Characteristics controlled for in simulations by reweighting the data 
Dimension Categories 
Total population Constituent nation and English region 
Households Household type, constituent nation and English region 
Age and gender (jointly) Males and females split into the following age categories: 
0–9, 10–15, 16–19 (dependent child), 16–19 (non-dependent), 
20–24, 25–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60+ 
Employment Industry, constituent nation and English region 
Ethnicity Asian (Great Britain only) 
Note: The sources of the population and household control totals we use for future years are Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2010), General Register Office for Scotland (2010), Welsh 
Assembly Government (2011), Office for National Statistics (2011b and 2012) and Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2012). We control for changes in total employment using forecasts 
from the Office for Budget Responsibility (2012). Within that total, changes in employment are allowed 
to vary by constituent nation and English region, and by industry, according to forecasts provided by 
Oxford Economics. 
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characteristics that we incorporate when reweighting the data is given in 
Table 2).  
We take a relatively simple approach to forecasting the incomes of 
elderly households. For such groups, a sophisticated projection would use 
dynamic microsimulation methods to age the current population, thus 
capturing automatically the increasing private incomes received by 
successive generations of pensioners. For simplicity, we do not model such 
cohort effects explicitly, but instead assume that private pension incomes 
grow in line with average earnings. We also do not report statistics that are 
heavily dependent on the incomes of such households (for example, rates of 
pensioner poverty), although they are, of course, included in our simulation 
of the income distribution as a whole.  
As is typical of survey data, the coverage of very rich individuals in the 
FRS data is poor and our methods are a relatively crude way of forecasting 
trends in the incomes of the very rich (we assume that investment income 
grows in line with forecasts of nominal GDP). We therefore do not report 
statistics that are highly sensitive to such trends (for example, mean income 
and the Gini coefficient). This also means that we do not need to rely on 
assumptions about behavioural changes among the very highest-income 
individuals – who have been affected by the considerable changes to the 
income tax system for those with incomes exceeding £100,000 per year – 
over which there is huge uncertainty (particularly over the extent to which 
those people are engaging in temporary income shifting or permanent 
responses). But note that we will therefore not pick up the substantial hit to 
this small group at the very top of the income distribution arising from 
measures announced as part of the fiscal tightening.11 
Note that throughout our analysis we use the retail price index (RPI) as 
our measure of inflation to compare real incomes in different years. This is 
consistent with the UK government’s official household income statistics, 
but is likely to understate the true growth in household incomes because the 
RPI is widely thought to overstate the true measure of inflation experienced 
by households. Furthermore, this problem is thought to have worsened 
following a change to the way in which clothing prices were sampled in 
2010.12 In our projections of future income trends, we therefore examine a 
variant in which we use the consumer price index (CPI) as our measure of 
inflation.  
 
11See Joyce and Phillips (2013) for distributional analysis of all tax and benefit measures announced as 
part of the fiscal consolidation that does include the impacts of measures affecting the very richest. 
12For more on the different measures of inflation in the UK, see Levell (2012).  
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III. Household incomes since the start of the recession 
Despite falls in GDP per head and increases in unemployment during the 
recession, average net household incomes actually increased, and at virtually 
identical (albeit sluggish, by recent historical standards) rates to those in the 
immediate pre-recession years.13 Between 2007–08 and 2009–10, average 
annual real-terms growth was 1.2 per cent at the mean and 0.6 per cent at the 
median, the latter of which is statistically significant from zero at the 5 per 
cent level.14 As Figure 1 shows, a key driver of this fact is the lag between 
the contraction in GDP and the fall in real earnings; a fiscal loosening also 
contributed to average income growth in both 2008 and (particularly) 2009.15 
This experience of continued household income growth despite the onset of 
recession mirrors that of other developed countries such as Sweden, the US 
and even Ireland.16 
Figure 1 suggests that changes in real earnings over this period did not 
vary widely across the earnings distribution, although the median (P50), if 
anything, seems to have performed slightly better than earnings at either end.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Percentile points of full-time weekly earnings 
 
 
Note: Real-terms index calculated using RPI all-items quarterly index. 
Source: Office for National Statistics, series CHAW for RPI. Authors’ calculations using the Labour 
Force Survey. 
 
 
13All references to historical trends or levels of income in this paper are derived from the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS) time series of the income distribution, for which key summary statistics are available 
online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/fiscalFacts/povertyStats (accessed 1 March 2013). 
14See Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012). 
15See Office for National Statistics (2011a) and discussion below. 
16See Jenkins et al. (2012). 
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FIGURE 2 
Real income growth incidence curves, 2007–08 to 2011–12 
 
 
Note: Income growth at the top and bottom five percentile points is not shown due to uncertainty from 
sampling and measurement error. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, 2007–08, 2009–10 and 2010–11, using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text. 
 
However, the growth incidence curves for net household income, shown in 
Figure 2, indicate that income growth was clearly most robust towards the 
bottom. Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012) attribute this to the fact that state 
benefit and tax credit amounts are customarily increased each April in line 
with inflation measured in the previous September: as a result of the then 
government’s decision to reduce the standard rate of VAT temporarily, 
inflation fell markedly from 5.0 per cent in the year to September 2008 to 
just 0.5 per cent, on average, in 2009–10, resulting in substantial real annual 
increases in benefit and tax credit amounts in that year. 
The growth incidence curve for 2010–11, however, shows that the 
surprisingly benign initial trends in net incomes after the recession hit were 
reversed in 2010–11, when real incomes fell right across the distribution. 
The reductions in income were large by historical standards: for example, 
the 3.1 per cent real fall at the median was the largest single-year decline 
since 1981. There was also a clear distributional pattern, with larger 
proportionate reductions seen at higher points in the income distribution. As 
discussed in Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012), the key explanation for this 
pattern is the fact that falls in real earnings were larger than falls in the real 
 Impacts of the recession on the UK income distribution 189 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2013 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
value of benefits. Furthermore, this picture of larger proportionate reductions 
towards the top of the income distribution repeats the patterns of income 
growth seen during previous UK recessions.17 
Figure 2 also shows our simulated income growth incidence curve for 
2011–12. We simulate further real year-on-year falls in household incomes, 
but much more evenly distributed across income groups. This largely reflects 
the convergence of the growth rates in the two major household income 
sources in 2011–12. Benefit and tax credit rates (which are relatively 
important for lower-income households) and average earnings (which are 
relatively important for middle- and higher-income households) both grew 
by about 3 per cent in cash terms. Overall, then, the patterns of income 
growth we simulate in 2011–12 barely change our impression of the 
distributional impact of the recession to date.  
Putting this together, the magnitude of the simulated income losses over 
the period 2007–08 to 2011–12 is clearly increasing with income, 
particularly within the bottom half of the distribution. This is reflected in the  
 
TABLE 3 
Income statistics (actual and simulated) 
 Annual 
median 
income 
change (%), 
real terms, 
relative to: 
Child poverty Poverty among 
working-age adults 
without children 
Inequality ratios 
Relative 
low 
income 
(%) 
Absolute 
low 
income 
(%) 
Relative 
low 
income 
(%) 
Absolute 
low 
income 
(%) 
90:10 90:50 50:10 
RPI CPI 
2007–08 
(actual) 
+0.1 +2.0 22.5 21.3 14.0 13.5 4.22 2.05 2.05 
2008–09 
(actual) 
+0.6 –0.2 21.8 20.2 14.7 14.1 4.20 2.07 2.02 
2009–10 
(actual) 
+0.7 –1.0 19.7 17.5 15.0 14.0 4.08 2.06 1.98 
2010–11 
(actual) 
–3.1 –1.7 17.5 17.5 14.6 14.6 3.92 2.02 1.94 
2011–12 –2.6 –2.1 17.5 19.3 15.1 15.8 3.90 2.01 1.94 
2012–13 –0.1 +0.4 19.0 20.9 15.1 15.9 3.96 2.01 1.97 
2013–14 –0.7 –0.3 20.5 23.1 15.7 16.6 4.02 2.00 2.01 
2014–15 –0.6 +0.1 20.9 23.8 16.0 17.0 4.08 2.03 2.01 
2015–16 +0.4 +1.5 21.4 23.8 16.0 17.2 4.12 2.05 2.01 
Note: Relative low income line is 60 per cent of contemporary median income. Absolute low income line 
is 60 per cent of the 2010–11 median in real terms (deflated using the RPI).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, 2010–11, using TAXBEN and 
assumptions specified in the text. ‘Actual’ relative low income figures from Department for Work and 
Pensions (2012); ‘actual’ absolute low income figures are authors’ calculations using Family Resources 
Survey, 2007–08 to 2010–11. 
 
17See Muriel and Sibieta (2009). 
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movements of inequality ratios (see Table 3): the 90:10 ratio fell by 8 per 
cent; the 50:10 ratio fell by 6 per cent; and the 90:50 ratio fell by 2 per cent.  
Given the progressivity of changes in the income distribution between 
2007–08 and 2011–12, we would generally expect declines in rates of 
relative income poverty. Using a poverty line of 60 per cent of the 
contemporary median, Table 3 shows that this was indeed the case for 
families with children, but not for working-age adults without children.18 
Tax and benefit policy seems very likely to be key to the explanation.19 Low-
income families with children are on average entitled to significantly more 
state support than those of working age without children, and so benefited 
disproportionately from the relative stability of benefit and tax credit 
entitlements in 2009–10 and 2010–11. There were also specific discretionary 
increases to child tax credit in 2008–09, 2009–10 and 2010–11. By contrast, 
those of working age without children would not have benefited to the same 
extent from the large real increases in most state benefits and tax credits in 
April 2009; and they were not major beneficiaries of any discretionary state 
benefit or tax credit changes during the recession.  
Of course, with median income and hence the relative poverty line falling 
substantially, trends in relative poverty are not a good guide to the evolution 
of absolute living standards. Using a fixed poverty line set at the level of the 
2010–11 relative poverty line in real terms, Table 3 shows that between 
2007–08 and 2011–12 the proportion of children falling below the absolute 
low income threshold fell by about 2 percentage points, but the proportion of 
such working-age adults without children rose by about 2 percentage points. 
Again, there is a clear difference between the fortunes of families with and 
without children. 
IV. Household incomes up to 2015–16 
There are reasons to expect that much of the impact on the income 
distribution associated with the recession is happening only now or is still to 
come. First, the government has embarked on a large fiscal tightening 
intended to restore the cyclically-adjusted current budget balance to surplus 
by 2017–18. This includes a large number of specific pre-announced 
changes to taxes and benefits up to 2015–16, which together amount to a net 
takeaway from households of 2.6 per cent of national income in that year, 
 
18We distinguish between families with and without children when discussing poverty rates, because 
poverty trends between these groups have differed very substantially in recent decades (and, as will 
become clear, the trends also differ under our projections). We report figures for child poverty (this is a 
high-profile statistic of considerable policy relevance, given the government’s 2020–21 child poverty 
targets that were enshrined in the Child Poverty Act 2010) and for poverty among those of working-age 
without dependent children. 
19Brewer et al. (2010) show that tax and benefit policy has been a very important determinant of trends 
in child poverty over the past decade. 
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comprised roughly equally of net tax rises and net benefit cuts.20 Second, as 
set out in Table 1, real earnings are still falling and are expected to continue 
to do so in the near term. 
Figure 3 shows the simulated income growth incidence curve for the 
period between 2011–12 and 2015–16. It also combines this with the 
analysis shown in Figure 2 to give an estimate of the total growth incidence 
curve from 2007–08 (before the recession) to 2015–16. Table 3 presents 
median incomes, poverty rates and inequality ratios from our simulated net 
household income distributions for each year up to 2015–16.  
The results suggest that, if macroeconomic forecasts are correct, the large 
falls in real incomes in the middle and upper parts of the distribution have 
already happened (although we do not look at what happens at the very top 
of the distribution because of the large uncertainty due to sampling and 
measurement error). This mostly reflects the forecasted relative stability of 
earnings (compared with RPI inflation) from 2012–13. But there is to be no  
 
FIGURE 3 
Simulated real income growth incidence curves, 2007–08 to 2015–16 
 
 
Note: Income growth at the top and bottom five percentile points is not shown due to uncertainty from 
sampling and measurement error. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, 2007–08 and 2010–11, using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text. 
 
 
20Emmerson, Keynes and Tetlow, 2013. 
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strong recovery in incomes either: for example, according to the official 
measure, we project a 1.1 per cent fall in real median income between 2011–
12 and 2015–16 (although this measure uses the RPI to deflate incomes and, 
as already mentioned, this is generally considered to somewhat overstate the 
true rate of inflation facing households; under the variant where we use the 
CPI to deflate incomes, real median income increases by 1.7 per cent 
between 2011–12 and 2015–16).  
In contrast, our simulations suggest that lower-income groups will fare 
considerably worse over the post-recession period (between 2011–12 and 
2015–16) than they did during and shortly after the recession itself (between 
2007–08 and 2011–12). The key explanation, as we show in the next section, 
is that those on lower incomes are the most affected by the substantial cuts to 
the welfare budget that form part of the post-recession fiscal tightening. The 
resulting pattern of income changes across the distribution between 2011–12 
and 2015–16 is therefore inequality-increasing and is essentially the 
converse of what happened over the previous four years since the onset of 
recession. The net effect is that, between 2007–08 and 2015–16, we simulate 
quite evenly spread proportionate reductions in incomes across the 
distribution. If anything, income falls in the bottom third of the distribution 
over this period are expected to be slightly smaller than those for other 
groups, on average. But the major difference between income groups is in 
the timing of the reductions in real income, rather than in their magnitude. 
The simulated poverty statistics shown in Table 3 show that we expect 
increases in poverty up to 2015–16 using both relative and absolute poverty 
lines. Again, there is variation by family type: child poverty rates are 
simulated to rise more steeply than poverty rates among the working-age 
childless. This represents a reversal in relative fortunes compared with the 
period between 2007–08 and 2011–12. Overall, we simulate that relative 
child poverty will still be slightly lower in 2015–16 than it was before the 
recession, in 2007–08. This is the net effect of quite volatile trends over the 
period, with sharp falls in relative child poverty over the four years after 
2007–08 and sharp rises over the subsequent four years. In contrast, the 
relative position of low-income working-age adults without children will be 
worse in 2015–16 than it was in 2007–08, and this reflects relatively steady 
increases in relative poverty among the group, continuing a trend that began 
almost three decades ago.21 
Our central projections suggest that the 90:10, 50:10 and 90:50 ratio 
measures of inequality will increase between 2011–12 and 2015–16. 
However, because of the very different trends during and immediately after 
the recession, the 50:10 and 90:10 inequality ratios are still forecast to be 
lower in 2015–16 than before the recession hit, in 2007–08, and the 90:50 
ratio is expected to have remained stable over the same period. This reflects 
 
21Cribb, Joyce and Phillips, 2012. 
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the fact that, as Figure 3 makes clear, projected cumulative income losses 
between 2007–08 and 2015–16 are generally increasing with income within 
the bottom third of the income distribution, but relatively flat in the top two-
thirds. 
V. Household incomes up to 2015–16: counterfactual and 
sensitivity analysis 
Finally, we consider how the distribution of net household income would 
evolve under different scenarios from those underlying our central estimates. 
The purpose of this is twofold. First, we redo our simulations under the 
counterfactual scenario in which direct tax and benefit policy had not been 
changed since April 2010. This enables us to isolate the effect of much of the 
post-recession fiscal consolidation on the distribution of income (most 
notably, separating these effects from the effects of the labour market 
changes that have occurred and are expected to occur over the period), 
yielding a better understanding of what is ultimately driving the overall 
impact of the recession on that distribution. Second, we redo our simulations 
under different macroeconomic scenarios – specifically for employment and 
earnings – from those implied by the OBR’s current central forecasts. This 
gives us a means of quantifying some key dimensions of the considerable 
uncertainty that clearly surrounds any exercise like this (particularly at 
present). 
In the case of our counterfactual tax and benefit policy scenario, it is 
important to note that this simulation takes as given the expected 
macroeconomic environment as forecasted by the OBR. If the tax rises and 
benefit cuts have (positive or negative) impacts on macroeconomic variables 
such as employment and earnings, then these will also affect the income 
distribution.22 It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate all possible 
effects of the fiscal consolidation on the income distribution, including any 
feedback effects it has on the macroeconomy (for example, via fiscal 
multipliers or effects on market sentiment) and through behavioural 
responses. But our subsequent macroeconomic sensitivity analysis is 
 
22In particular, the impacts of indirect tax changes – most importantly, the 2.5 percentage point rise in 
VAT in January 2011 – are therefore incorporated in both our central forecasts in the previous section and 
our counterfactual policy scenario here, via effects on the general price level as forecasted by the OBR. In 
practice, the incidence of indirect tax will not be uniform, but income distributions are typically measured 
by applying economy-wide deflators to nominal incomes, so this reflects a limitation of real income 
measurement that goes well beyond our own analysis. Note also that the higher inflation caused by the 
VAT rise could lead to higher benefit rates in 2012 than would otherwise have been the case, because the 
uprating of most benefits in April 2012 was based on CPI inflation in September 2011. We might also 
expect increases in the prices of goods to be accompanied by increases in nominal earnings. On the other 
hand, the Bank of England has a 2 per cent CPI inflation target: isolating the effect of the VAT rise on 
benefit rates and earnings levels would involve isolating the monetary policy response. All these issues 
are abstracted from here. 
194 Fiscal Studies  
 
 
 
 
© 2013 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2013 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
designed precisely to give the reader an idea of how important these kinds of 
factors might be. 
We consider scenarios in which the labour market performs better or 
worse than currently expected, with employment 400,000 higher or lower 
and average earnings 4 per cent higher or lower in 2015–16 than currently 
forecast by the OBR. The deviations from the OBR forecasts of earnings 
growth and employment that these scenarios represent are at least as large as 
the revisions to those OBR forecasts between November 2010 and 
December 2012.23 In other words, in the ‘optimistic’ scenario the 2015–16 
economy is where the OBR expected it to be in November 2010, and in the 
‘pessimistic’ scenario the deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook since 
the November 2010 forecast is twice as bad as the OBR currently expects. 
We also consider what would happen if the rate of average earnings 
growth were as the OBR expects, but earnings inequality changed. In other 
words, we assume that earnings in 2015–16 are lower in some earnings 
decile groups, and higher in others, than they would be under our central 
scenario (which does allow for variation in earnings growth by industry, but 
not within industries). We consider both progressive and regressive patterns 
of earnings growth, fixing average earnings at their level under the central 
scenario. Our ‘progressive’ earnings growth scenario assumes that average 
earnings relative to the first earnings decile group fall by 1 per cent for the 
second earnings decile group, 2 per cent for the third, and so on up to 9 per 
cent for the tenth decile group. Our ‘regressive’ earnings growth scenario 
assumes the reverse: for example, the average earnings ratio between the 
tenth and first earnings decile groups rises by 9 percentage points. One 
could, of course, extrapolate from changes in earnings inequality over some 
previous period but, given the macroeconomic shocks that have occurred 
recently, it is not clear how informative this would be, so it seems to us 
preferable to document the sensitivity comprehensively by considering very 
markedly progressive and regressive scenarios. 
Table 4 presents median incomes, poverty rates and inequality ratios from 
our counterfactual 2015–16 income distributions, and compares these with 
our baseline 2015–16 forecasts from the previous section. Figure 4 shows 
the growth incidence curves between 2007–08 and 2015–16 under the 
baseline and counterfactual assumptions. Together, they highlight the 
following key points: 
• The direct tax and benefit reforms implemented as part of the fiscal 
tightening from April 2011 onwards are, unsurprisingly, set to reduce 
household incomes across most of the income distribution. 
  
 
23See Office for Budget Responsibility (2010 and 2012). 
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• The pattern of losses from those reforms is set to be inequality-
increasing within the bottom half of the income distribution, as we might 
expect given the substantial welfare cuts amounting to a planned 1.3 per 
cent of national income by 2015–16.24 The cuts to social security almost 
entirely explain the projected reductions in incomes within the bottom 
half of the distribution in the post-recession period of fiscal 
consolidation. 
TABLE 4 
Income statistics from counterfactual simulated income distributions, 2015–16 
Scenario Median 
income, 
£ per week 
(2013–14 
prices) 
Child poverty Poverty among 
working-age adults 
without children 
Inequality ratios 
Relative 
low 
income 
(%) 
Absolute 
low 
income 
(%) 
Relative 
low 
income 
(%) 
Absolute 
low 
income 
(%) 
90:10 90:50 50:10 
Memo: 
2015–16 
central 
projection 
449 21.4 23.8 16.0 17.2 4.12 2.05 2.01 
        
No tax and 
benefit 
reforms after 
2010–11 
451 16.6 18.5 15.2 16.1 4.02 2.06 1.95 
        
Higher 
employment 
and earnings 
462 22.2 22.8 15.9 16.2 4.16 2.05 2.03 
        
Lower 
employment 
and earnings 
436 20.4 25.0 16.1 18.3 4.07 2.04 1.99 
        
Progressive 
earnings 
growth 
452 21.7 23.6 16.0 16.8 4.06 2.02 2.02 
        
Regressive 
earnings 
growth 
444 21.1 24.1 16.1 17.6 4.17 2.08 2.00 
Note: Median income amounts are expressed as equivalent amounts for a couple with no children, using 
the modified OECD equivalence scale. Relative low income line is 60 per cent of contemporary median 
income. Absolute low income line is 60 per cent of the 2010–11 median in real terms (deflated using the 
RPI). See text for description of the scenarios. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, 2010–11, using TAXBEN and 
assumptions specified in the text. 
 
24Emmerson, Keynes and Tetlow, 2013. Comparative evidence from the EU (looking at reforms 
implemented by Summer 2011) suggests that this is by no means a feature of all post-recession austerity 
packages (Avram et al., 2013). 
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FIGURE 4 
Sensitivity analysis, 2007–08 to 2015–16 
 
 
Note: Income growth at the top and bottom five percentile points is not shown due to uncertainty from 
sampling and measurement error. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, 2007–08 and 2010–11, using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text. 
 
• The seventh and eighth income decile groups are exceptions to the rule. 
The net effect of the direct tax and benefit changes on their incomes is 
close to zero, on average. This is because these groups are the biggest 
gainers from a substantial tax cut over the period: namely, the 
discretionary increases to the income tax personal allowance (the 
amount of income exempt from income tax). Nearer to the top of the 
distribution, households tend to be net losers from the changes. 
Contributing factors include real reductions to the higher-rate income tax 
threshold, rises in National Insurance contributions, and the withdrawal 
of child benefit from higher-income families.25 
• There is important variation in the simulated effects of the fiscal 
tightening by family type as well as by income. Our simulations suggest 
that the direct tax and benefit reforms increase relative and absolute low 
income poverty among children by about 5 percentage points by 2015–
 
25As explained earlier, other tax rises aimed specifically at the very highest-income individuals have 
also been very significant right at the top end of the distribution, but these are not fully captured here – we 
exclude the top five percentile groups from the analysis, as the methods used here cannot be used to 
project their incomes robustly. 
 Impacts of the recession on the UK income distribution 197 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2013 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
16, but have an effect of only about 1 percentage point on the same 
poverty rates among working-age adults without children. The 
qualitative pattern is not surprising, as low-income families with 
children tend to get a relatively large share of their income from the 
state. 
• Different macroeconomic out-turns would have little direct impact on 
the bottom third of the distribution, where employment income tends to 
be relatively unimportant. Within the top two-thirds, more benign out-
turns would tend to increase income inequality (and vice versa), since 
labour market income accounts for a larger average share of income as 
one moves further up the distribution.  
• Under the ‘optimistic’ scenario, the cumulative income reductions 
between 2007–08 and 2015–16 peak in the fourth income decile 
(whereas under the central scenario the proportionate reductions are 
essentially the same for the top two-thirds of the distribution). This is 
because those further up the distribution gain most from the more benign 
labour market outcomes. Under the ‘pessimistic’ scenario, the 
cumulative income reductions are even more clearly progressive than 
those under the central scenario, with inequality declining within the top 
half of the distribution as well as the bottom half. Under either of the 
alternative scenarios, the proportionate reductions in income between 
2007–08 and 2015–16 for those towards the bottom of the distribution 
are among the smallest.26 
• Even the very marked deviations from uniformity in earnings growth 
rates across the earnings distribution that we consider change the results 
relatively little. For example, the simulated level of median income in 
2015–16 is affected by no more than 1 per cent. This is mainly due to 
two factors: the fact that there is not a very strong correlation between 
being a low-earning individual and being in a low-income household; 
and the progressive tax and benefit system. 
• It is also clear that progressive patterns of earnings growth are not well 
targeted at reducing relative poverty. This is primarily due to the 
mismatch between people’s ranking in the individual pre-tax earnings 
distribution and the net household income distribution (for example, 
about one-quarter of minimum-wage workers are in the top half of the 
net household income distribution27). The ‘progressive’ earnings growth 
scenario actually increases relative child poverty, because some working 
 
26We have made the neutral assumption here of uniform changes in earnings and no change in the 
composition of the employed population relative to the central scenario. Of course, one could in principle 
come up with any number of possible scenarios for the distribution of earnings growth or employment 
growth around the average/total, and this would affect the impact on the distribution of net household 
income. 
27See Brewer, May and Phillips (2009). 
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individuals towards the bottom of the earnings distribution are situated 
around the middle of the household income distribution (for example, 
because they live with another earner), and hence this scenario raises the 
relative poverty line by raising median income. 
VI. Conclusions 
Given the severity of the recession, substantial reductions in household 
incomes were surely inevitable. But the timing, mechanisms and distribution 
of the shock to national income are important and more complicated issues. 
This paper has used microsimulation techniques in an effort to understand 
the likely medium-term implications of the recent recession for the 
distribution of income in the UK. 
Our simulations suggest that, if macroeconomic forecasts are correct, the 
large falls in real incomes in the middle and upper parts of the distribution28 
– driven primarily by the failure of the earnings of those in work to keep 
pace with inflation – have already occurred. In contrast, much of the pain for 
lower-income groups is happening now or is still to come. This is because 
those on lower incomes are the most affected by the substantial cuts to the 
welfare budget. Hence, they have been hit much harder by the post-recession 
fiscal tightening – an inevitable policy response given that the recession 
permanently reduced the productive (and tax-generating) capacity of the 
economy – than by the direct macroeconomic effects of the recession itself.  
The major difference between income groups is in the timing of the 
reductions in real income, rather than in their magnitude. For those in the 
middle and upper parts of the distribution, dependent mainly on labour 
market income, falls in income happened largely between 2009–10 and 
2011–12. For those towards the bottom, dependent more on benefit incomes, 
falls in income will happen largely between 2010–11 and 2015–16. The net 
effect is that, between 2007–08 and 2015–16, we simulate quite evenly 
spread proportionate reductions in incomes across the distribution. If 
anything, income falls in the bottom third of the distribution over this period 
are expected to be slightly smaller than those for other groups, on average. 
Our simulation results, and hence conclusions, make use of official 
macroeconomic forecasts of employment and earnings. Producing such 
forecasts at the moment must be exceedingly challenging. There is 
significant uncertainty over the extent to which the recession has led to a 
permanent reduction in productive capacity, and whether the sustainable rate 
of growth is now lower than previously thought (either because the 
recession’s impact might itself have lowered the long-run growth rate or 
because events associated with the recession revealed information about that 
 
28Although we do not look at what happens at the very top of the distribution because of the large 
uncertainty due to sampling and measurement error. 
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growth rate). Clearly, there is a wider and very challenging research agenda 
to be made out of these big macroeconomic questions. However, our 
sensitivity analysis does suggest that the central and qualitative conclusions 
of this paper regarding the medium-term distributional implications of the 
recession are unlikely to be drastically altered under realistic alternative 
scenarios. 
Why, then, is the recent recession set to have such a long-lasting effect on 
household living standards in the UK? Mostly, it is because this was a deep 
recession that is being followed by a sharp fiscal contraction: the drop in UK 
GDP from peak to trough was larger even than that seen during the Great 
Depression; and the fiscal consolidation, required to address what were 
unsustainable levels of borrowing, is leading to the tightest period for 
spending on public services since the 1940s. But the UK has been 
experiencing a period of weak growth in living standards for all but the very 
top of the distribution since the early part of the previous decade, both 
compared with past years and compared with GDP growth at the time. A 
mechanical explanation for the disconnect with GDP growth is increased 
wage inequality, a decline in labour’s share of national income and an 
increased fraction of total employee remuneration being made in the form of 
social contributions.29 Although the impact of the recession on household 
living standards in the UK will be long-lasting, future research must not 
neglect the underlying causes of the past disconnect between economic 
growth and the living standards of most households, as well as the highly 
uncertain path for future economic growth. 
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